I. Introduction
During contract formation parties frequently try at some stage of the negotiations to include their own standard terms in the contract. When the contract is transnational, these standard terms often contain choice oflaw clauses. 2 More often than not, the standard forms will designate different laws: for example, one party having its place of business in Denmark provides for the application of Danish law to the contract in his standard forms; the other party, established in New York, respectively provides for the application of the law of New York. The question then is: Which law governs the contract? And, first of all, which law is applicable to the question of whether an agreement on the applicable law has been reached? Given that both parties preferred choosing the applicable law rather than leaving its determination to the application of objective connecting factors, should at least one of the choice of law clauses be respected, and if so, which one? Which law applies to decide the conflict of the choice oflaw clauses?
The issue of conflicting standard terms is widely discussed under the succinct expression battle of forms. At the substantive law level, different contract law systems give different answers to the question as to which party wins the battle. The outcome of the battle of forms will thus depend on the applicable law. The following contribution first provides a short overview of the solutions to battle of forms situations in a number of national legal systems, the CISG, the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts (UNIDROIT Principles), the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL), and the European Commission's Proposal of a Common European Sales Law (CESL) (II). In a second step, the proposals to solve the battle of forms issue at the Private International Law level, to be found in legal doctrine and national case-laws, will be set out (III). In November 2012, the Hague Conference on Private International Law proposed, in its Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts, a solution to the problem of conflicting choice of law clauses in standard terms in transnational situations. ' The Hague solution will be presented, then illustrated using a series of transnational case scenarios involving battle of forms situations, and finally evaluated in comparison with the alternative solutions suggested in legal doctrine (IV). The contribution then addresses the further situation in which the conflicting choice of law is between domestic law regimes and the CISG (V) before drawing conclusions (VI). A.
Last-Shot Rules
In two leading cases, the English courts have solved battle of forms situations by applying the rule of general contract law according to which offer and acceptance must match (and the acceptance is required to be the "mirror image" of the offer).' If a declaration purported to be an acceptance refers to standard terms differing from those of the offer, it constitutes a new offer which is regarded as being accepted at the latest when the party receiving it starts performing the contract. It is thus, in principle, the last set of forms which prevails and which becomes part of the contract (last-shot rule). 8 The last-shot rule can also be found in a leading Scottish court decision.
9 Decisions in Australia have referred to the English precedents when discussing battle of forms issues and in Australian legal doctrine it is assumed that the courts might be willing to apply the last-shot rule. ' 0 It seems that the courts in South Africa also tend to apply a last-shot rule to battle of forms scenarios." The Chinese Contract Act 1999 arguably provides a last-shot rule. Last but not least, Art. 19 of the CISG is understood as a last-shot rule in some court decisions as well as by many commentators, notably, but not exclusively, in Common Law jurisdictions.
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If the standard terms that were last referred to contain different or additional terms that do not materially alter the terms of the offer when compared to the terms first employed, in a certain number of yet other contract law systems the contract is also concluded with the modifications of the terms last referred to (i. e. a last-shot rule is then applied).
14 However, in practice very few standard terms will contain only non-material modifications when compared to the terms used by the other party. In most, if not almost all situations the standard tenns will differ with respect to substantial issues (such as, e.g., the law applicable to a transnational contract).
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Under last-shot rules, the forms that were last referred to prevail in total over any other forms that were previously referred to. Previous references to other standard terms are without effect and to be disregarded.
B.
First-Shot Rules
According to another approach, it is in principle the first set of standard forms used during the contract negotiations that will prevail. dominant opinion in the Netherlands, the requirement in Art. 6:225(3) of the Dutch Civil Code that the refusal be "express" excludes that it is made only in standard terms. 16 Ideally, this rule shall lead to an explicit exchange between the parties as to which standard terms will eventually prevail.
In the USA, under certain circumstances the UCC can also lead to the integration of the first standard forms employed.
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Under first-shot rules, the forms that were first referred to prevail in total over the forms that were subsequently referred to. Later references to other standard terms are in principle to be disregarded. If, upon entering into a contract, the parties each refer to their own standard terms, the contract is deemed to have been entered into under the terms which are not in conflict with each other. The provisions of law concerning the type of contract concerned apply in lieu of any conflicting terms. (2) In the case of conflicting standard terms, the contract is not deemed to have been entered into if one party has explicitly indicated before the contract is entered into or without delay thereafter and not by way of the standard terms that the party does not deem the contract to have been entered into. A party does not have this right if the party has performed the contract in part or in full or has accepted performance by the other party".
23 Art. 6.179 of the Civil Code of Lithuania (in English translation): "Conflict of standard conditions. Where a contract is concluded by an exchange of standard conditions between both parties, it shall be considered that the contract is concluded on the basis of the standard conditions which are common in substance unless one party clearly indicates in advance a disagreement with the standard conditions proposed by the other party, or informs the other party without delay that it is opposed to the other party's standard conditions." On this provision V. MIKELENAS Under knock-out rules, the standard terms of neither party prevail. The existing black letter rules establishing lmock-out rules thus provide that "the contract is deemed to have been entered into under the terms which are not in conflict with each other" 29 or "that the contract is concluded on the basis of the standard conditions which are common in substance" 30 or that "the contract may be concluded according to the agreed clauses of contract and those standard-form clauses with substantially similar content".
31 Under knock-out rules "[t]he general conditions form part of the contract to the extent that they are common in substance". 32 
D.
Hybrid Solutions § 2-207 of the UCC combines elements of first-shot, last-shot and knock-out rules, the precise solution depending on the circumstances of the case. 33 In other jurisdictions, the above-mentioned general rules may be displaced by different solutions under certain circumstances. In Dutch law, for example, if a party expressly rejects the application of the standard forms to which the first reference 33 § 2-207(1) abandons, in principle, the last-shot rule and "marked the end to the common law's mirror image rule", see e.g. C. KEATING (note 4), at 2684. However, a lastshot rule still applies if"acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms", Sect.
(1) in fine, and under the further conditions that the offer does not "expressly limit acceptance to the terms of the offer", Sect. (2)(a), that the terms of the acceptance do not "materially alter" those of the offer, Sect. (2)(b), or that no notification of objection to the terms of the acceptance is given in due time, Sect. (2)(c). On the other hand a first-shot rule applies under Sect. (1) in conjunction with Sect. (2)(a) if "the offer expressly limits acceptance to the terms of the offer", or (b) the te1ms of the acceptance "materially alter" those of the offer or (c) "notification of objection to them" is given, unless the "acceptance is expressly made conditional on assent to the additional or different terms", Sect.
(1) in fine. Finally, a knock-out rule applies if the contract is not fonned under Sect. (1) or (2) but conduct of both parties "recognizes the existence of a contract'', in particular if they start executing the contract; see e.g. E.A. FARNSWORTH (note 4), at para. 3.21; C.A. STEPHENS (note 1), at 237 (for the "Pre-Code-Situation"), 246, 250 (for the use of"the old last-shot rule), and 251 (for the knock-out rule in Sect. (3) ). For § 2-207 of the UCC in practice, see C. KEATING (note 4). was made and if the standard terms differ with respect to major points of the contract, a knock-out rule will apply instead of the first-shot rule; if there is an express refusal and if the alterations in the second set of standard terms are of minor importance, a last-shot rule applies instead of the first-shot rule. 34 Under hybrid solutions, but also in some jurisdictions providing first-shot or last-shot rules, the rule that eventually applies may thus very much depend on the circumstances of the case. ). These questions are to be decided according to the PIL of the forum.
The second question is whether the parties have actually agreed on the applicable law. Nowadays, it is well established that an agreement on the applicable law constitutes a second contract, to be analysed separately from the main (for example construction or sales) contract. 37 The question then is: if the law 34 C.B.P. MAHE (note 16), at 123-124, paras 2 and 3. 35 Further complications may arise if one or both of the parties explicitly state in their standard forms that they refuse to accept standard terms differing from their own terms (so-called Abwehrklauseln, "rejection clauses"). Some contract law systems, such as the PECL and the CESL regard such declarations as relevant only when made explicitly and not by way of standard terms, Art. 2:209(2)(a) PECL, Art. 39 (2) applicable to the main contract was purportedly designated during the contract negotiations, which law applies to the question of whether an agreement on the applicable law has actually been formed and whether this agreement is valid?
If, during the contract negotiations, only one law was purportedly designated as the law applicable to the contract, it is recognized in international choice of law instruments that "consent is to be determined by reference to the law that would apply if such consent existed". 38 In other words the putatively chosen law applies in order to determine whether the parties agreed on the applicable law and whether the agreement is valid. 39 For example Art. 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation (on "Consent and material validity") states that "[ t ]he existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid." Art. 2(3) of the 1955 Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to International Sales of Goods reads: "Les conditions, relatives au consentement des parties quant a la loi declaree applicable, sont determinees par cette loi. " 40 Similar rules are to be found in national statutes on PIL.
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The issue is much more complicated and controversial when the parties designate in their respective standard forms not one but different laws to govern the contract, which is frequently the case when both parties use standard terms in transnational contracts. 42 If both parties to a transnational contract 43 43 For the question as to when a contract is to be regarded as "international", see e.g. Art. 1(1) and (2) of the Hague Principles: "!. These Principles apply to choice of law in international contracts [ ... ]''. 2. For the purposes of these Principles, a contract is international unless the parties have their establishments in the same State and the forms, and if these standard terms designate different laws to govern the contract, which law then applies to decide the battle of forms and, consequently, which law applies to the choice of law agreement and -if this agreement is valid -to the main contract? 44 This issue has so far never been explicitly addressed in a black letter rule, neither in the Rome I Regulation 45 
6 nor in any national PIL statute. Given the complexity of the issue, the courts have so far often tried to avoid or circumvent the issue of the law applicable to the choice of law agreement or they simply applied the !ex fori.
B.
Proposals for a Solution
1.
Applying the lex fori A first solution could be found in solving the battle of conflicting choice of law clauses in standard forms according to the lex fori. This approach was eventually applied by some courts confronted with complex issues of choice of law in diverging standard forms, 47 and it has also been suggested by a minority opinion in the UK and Switzerland.4 objective connecting factors. Instead of ignoring the choices altogether,4 9 the law of the forum may play "a residual and mediating role".
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Applying the !ex fori is however an "imperfect solution" even in the eyes of its proponents, "and reliance on the law of the forum raises an obvious forum shopping objection" 51 (in the same case, depending on the forum chosen by the claimant, English courts would, for example, apply a last-shot rule, whereas French, German or Swiss courts, for example, a knock-out rule.) The forum is often chosen for procedural reasons and there is not necessarily a link between the contract and the !ex fori. 52 What is more, since the !ex fori is unlmown when the contract is formed, this approach results in considerable uncertainty until a case is eventually brought before the courts. 53 Last but not least, modem PIL instruments very much suppress the role of the forum in determining the consent to a choice of law, and rightly so. For example, under Art. 3(5) and 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation "invoking the lexfori is no longer an option''. 54 
Knock-Out Rule at the PIL Level. Using Objective Connecting Factors Instead
According to a second opinion dominant in English legal doctrine and, in the past, also in Germany, if the parties use conflicting choice of law clauses in their standard terms the choice will be ineffective and the applicable law be determined according to objective connecting factors. 55 In support of this solution, it has been argued that there is no agreement on the applicable law, and not even the appearance of an agreement, if both parties want to have different laws applied. This solution also has the advantage of being simple, clear and its results are easily foreseeable for the parties. 56 However, if one party designates the law of A to govern the contract and the other the law of B, "rejecting both choices may defeat the expectation of both parties, and any third parties relying upon the contract. In other words, the fact that both parties cannot have their preferences respected is not obviously a sound reason for saying that we should respect neither." 57 
Use of the Law Applicable in the Absence of a Choice to Determine the Prevailing Choice of Law Clause
According to a third approach, the battle of forms shall be decided under the law that would be applicable in the absence of choice. This law then decides whether any standard forms prevail, or whether the conflicting choice-of-law clauses knock each other out. If one set of standard forms prevails, the law chosen in these terms shall then apply to the choice-of-law agreement 58 (and -if the choice is valid under this law-eventually also to the main contract).
This approach has been criticized for splitting the applicable law between a first law applicable to the battle of forms in general (first step) and a second law, determined in the first step, and then applicable to analysing the existence of an agreement on the applicable law (second step ); 59 the battle of forms is then decided (in the first step) by a law that may eventually not be applicable since, in the end, a choice of the applicable law may be accepted and this law applied (in the second step ). 
4.
Analysing terms shall apply to the choice of law agreement. Should, on the other hand, both designated laws reach the conclusion that the respective terms were included in the contract (and the respective laws validly chosen), the choice of law clauses will knock each other out, or the conflict could be solved by taking inspiration from the rule governing the battle of forms under the !ex fori, in particular if it applies a knock-out rule; in this case, objective connecting factors should then be applied.' 1 This approach is complicated and its results may be fortuitous. 62 It has also been said that it favours parties referring to jurisdictions using a first-or last-shot approach (as opposed to parties designating a law using a knock-out rule). 63 When some of the proponents of this approach suggest having recourse to the lexfori, all the above mentioned arguments against applying the !ex fori' 4 apply here as well. It has further been argued, and rightly so, that this approach tends to ignore that either there is a choice of law agreement or there isn't; to apply two laws in parallel in order to determine whether there is consent would lead to the existence (or the non-existence) of two rather than one contract on the applicable law. 65 Last but not least it is hardly convincing that the choice of law in one of the standard terms should be respected if the other standard terms do not form part of the contract under the law they designate, whereas recourse to objective connecting factors should be made if under both of the designated laws the standard terms (and the choice oflaw clauses they contain) are validly integrated into the contract. 66 
5.

Comparing the Rules on the Battle of Forms under the Chosen Laws. Knock-Out as Residual Rule
According to a fifth proposal, regard should be had to the solutions to battle of forms situations under the laws designated in the standard forms of both parties. 67 The situation is uncomplicated, according to this proposal, if both designated laws provide the same solution to the battle of forms. If under both laws, conflicting standard terms knock each other out, the choice of law clauses would annul each other and the applicable law would be determined by objective connecting factors.
If on the contrary both designated laws applied last-shot rules, the choice of law clause in the standard terms of the party who fired the last shot should prevail. The situation is more complicated if both laws designate different rules when it comes to dealing with the battle of forms. The only solution to this situation would be a mutual knocking out of the contradictory choice of law clauses. 68 In the case of a lmock-out of the choice of law clauses, the applicable law is to be determined by objective connecting factors. When looking for support for this recourse to a knock-out rule as a residual rule, reference to the UNIDROIT Principles and the PECL is made, both of them providing knock-out rules (though at a substantive law level).
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This approach achieves very reasonable results in all kinds of battle of forms situations without giving preference to any of the parties or any of the laws designated. If this rule is phrased as a specific PIL rule, it is possible to avoid any recourse to the !ex fori. -When it comes to actually applying this approach, the challenge lies in determining the precise solutions that foreign laws provide for the battle of forms situation for the case under examination.
Combining the above Solutions No. 5 and No. 3
A sixth approach combines the above solutions No. 5 and No. 3: If both designated laws use a last-shot rule, the choice of law clause in the standard forms introduced last shall prevail. If both laws use knock-out rules, the choice oflaw clauses knock each other out. 70 So far, the approach is similar to the one presented supra, 5. If both laws designate different rules for dealing with the battle of forms, the law that decides the battle of forms shall, according to this approach, be determined through objective connecting factors, i.e. according to the rules applicable in the absence of a choice (first step). The law thereby determined shall then decide the battle (second step). If this law uses a last-shot rule, the law designated in the last shot shall prevail. If it uses a knock-out rule, there is no choice of law and objective connecting factors apply instead (compare the solution supra, 3.).
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To give an example: A German company submits a request for services to a service provider established in England. Both parties use standard terms designating the law of their respective jurisdictions to govern the contract. The English party fires the last shot. English law uses a last-shot, German law a knockout rule. Both laws thus designate different rules when it comes to dealing with the battle of forms. At this stage it is suggested to use objective connecting factors (instead of the knock-out rule which is suggested under the approach presented supra, 5.). Under many PIL systems (such as, e.g. Art. 4(l)(b) of the Rome I Regulation), this would lead to the application of the law of the service provider, in 68 meeting to include this issue in its considerations and to introduce a specific provision addressing this problem. It states:
"Article 6-Agreement on the Choice of Law and Battle of Forms 1. Subject to paragraph 2, a) whether the parties have agreed to a choice of law is determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to; b) if the parties have used standard terms designating different laws and under both of these laws the same standard terms prevail, the law designated in the prevailing terms applies; if under these laws different standard terms prevail, or if under one or both of these laws no standard terms prevail, there is no choice of law.
2. The law of the State in which a party has its establishment determines whether that party has consented to the choice of law if, under the circumstances, it would not be reasonable to make that determination under the law specified in paragraph l."
Art. 6(1 )(b) of the Hague Principles addresses, for the first time in black letter rules, the issue of the law applicable to choice of law in battle of forms situations. When deliberating the provision that eventually became Art. 6 of the Hague Principles, the Special Commission used a series of case scenarios. The following chapter adopts the same approach using scenarios in order to illustrate the functioning of Art. 6 of the Hague Principles.
B.
Case Scenarios
Scenario 1: Choice of Law Clause in the Standard Forms of One Party Only [Art. 6(1)(a) of the Hague Principles]
Scenario 1: One of the parties to an international service contract7 6 designates the law of the Canadian Province Quebec as the law applicable to the contract in its standard forms. The other party's standard terms do not provide a choice oflaw clause.
The starting point for the analysis of the first scenario is Art. 6( 1 )(a) of the Hague Principles: If the law applicable to the contract was designated during the negotiations, the question of whether a valid agreement on the applicable law was is "determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to". "Once the consent is confirmed by that law, all issues relating to the remainder of the main contract are then assessed under the chosen law as the lex causae, not as the putatively applicable law. This first case thus falls within the scope of application of Art. 6( 1 )(a) of the Hague Principles. Given that only one law was designated during the contract negotiations, this law purportedly agreed to determines whether there was an actual agreement on the choice of law clause. The special provision on battle of forms in lit. (b) of Art. 6(1) of the Hague Principles does not apply since it is limited to situations in which both "parties have used standard terms designating different laws". In the first scenario, "whether the parties have agreed to a choice oflaw is [thus] determined by the law that was purportedly agreed to", Art. 6(l)(a), i.e. the law of Quebec.
2.
Scenario In legal doctrine it has been argued that in a scenario such as case 2a, there is no consensus on the applicable law. The choice of law clauses in both parties' standard terms should thus be disregarded and the law governing the contract were to be determined by way of objective connecting factors. 
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frequently included in standard terms. The Commission further assumed that most parties prefer to have their own law applied and thus have a tendency to choose their own law in their standard terms. There is much evidence today to support these assumptions which were also confirmed by representatives of the international lawyers' associations present at the Hague meeting. If this is so, the potential for conflicting choice of law clauses in standard terms is enormous. 82 If in these situations the choice of law in the parties' standard terms were always deprived of their effect, the scope of application for a choice of the applicable law by the parties would be considerably reduced, even though -in situations such as scenario 2a -both parties prefer a choice of the applicable law rather than having the applicable law determined through objective connecting factors.
Given the high degree of uncertainty that currently reigns in battle of forms scenarios, the Special Commission decided to explicitly address such situations and to adopt a solution that respects party autonomy as much as possible, while, at the same time, avoiding needless complexities. According to Art. 6(1 )(b) 1 st alt. of the Hague Principles "if the parties have used standard terms designating different laws and under both of these laws the same standard terms prevail, the law designated in the prevailing terms applies". This is exactly the situation in scenario 2a: Both parties have designated jurisdictions applying last-shot rules to the battle of forms. Under both laws, the standard forms that were submitted last prevail, i.e. B 's standard terms designating English law. Pursuant to Art. 6(1 )(b) 1 st alt. of the Hague Principles, this result is respected and English contract law applies.
Since both laws designated by the parties solve the battle of forms in favour of the forms submitted by the same party (in the above scenario: B), the apparent conflict is in fact a false conflict. The choice of law clause in B 's standard forms is thus respected and no recourse to objective connecting factors is needed.
Scenario 2b: Both Designated Laws Apply
First-Shot Rules [Art. 6(1)(b) 1' 1 alt.
of the Hague Principles]
Scenario 2b: A makes an offer designating in its standard terms Dutch law as the law governing the contract. B responds declaring acceptance but providing in its standard forms the application of another law applying a first-shot rule to the same scenario.
Given that from a comparative perspective first-shot rules are much rarer than lastshot or knock-out rules, 83 scenario 2b will much less frequently appear in practice than any other scenario. The approach of the Hague Principles to this situation is basically the same as in scenario 2a: Once again "the parties have used standard terms designating different laws [Dutch law and another law applying a first-shot 82 This does not necessarily mean that these conflicts are frequently resolved in litigation before courts. For reasons not to go to courts in battle of forms situations, and arguably in contract cases in general, see C. KEATING (note 4); see also G.G. MURRAY, A Corporate Council's Perspective of the "Battle of Forms", [1979] [1980] A makes an offer designating Dutch law in its standard terms as the applicable law; B, established in the UK, declares acceptance providing in its standard tenns the application of English law.
In scenario 3, both parties designate different laws in their standard terms. These laws apply different rules when it comes to dealing with battle of forms situations (Dutch law applies a first-shot rule contrary to the last-shot rule prevailing in English law). This scenario thus addresses the situation not of a false but of a true conflict: The parties have designated different laws under which the battle of forms is won by different parties. This scenario is governed by Art. 6(1 )(b) 2nct alt. of the Hague Principles: "if the parties have used standard terms designating different laws and [ ... ] if under these laws different standard terms prevail, [ ... ] there is no choice of law". In such situations, the choice of law clauses in the parties' standard tenns thus knock each other out, no standard terms prevail, there consequently is no choice of law, and the law applicable to the contract is to be determined by way of objective connecting factors. In the following procedure, the choice of law clauses in the standard terms are then to be disregarded.
5.
Scenarios 4a and b: At Least One of the Designated Laws Applies a Knock-Out Rule [Art. 6(1)(b) 3'd alt. of the Hague Principles]
Scenario 4a: One party makes an offer designating Chinese law in its standard terms. The other party declares acceptance providing in its standard terms the application of French law.
Scenario 4b: A German, Swiss, or Austrian party makes an offer designating German, Swiss, or Austrian law respectively as the law applicable to the contract. The other party, established in France, Poland, Estonia, or Lithuania, declares acceptance providing in its standard terms the application of the French, Polish, Estonian, or Lithuanian law.
Scenario 4a addresses the situation in which both parties designate different laws in their standard terms, one of these laws applying a last-shot rule (the Chinese Contract Act of 1999, e.g.
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), the other a knock-out rule (French law, e.g. 85 ).
84 See supra (note 12). 85 Supra (note 18).
Scenario 4b finally addresses the scenario which is in practice arguably rather frequent, s 6 that both parties designate different laws, both of them applying knock-out rules.
Once again we are dealing with a true conflict without being in a position to determine consent of the parties as to the applicable law. These scenarios are addressed by Art. 6(1 )(b) 3 rct alt. of the Hague Principles: "the parties have used standard terms designating different laws and under one or both of these laws no standard terms prevail" . Consequently "there is no choice of law" (3rct alt. in fine) and objective connecting factors are needed in order to determine the law applicable to the contract.
C. Level of Precision of the Comparison under Art. 6(1) of the Hague Principles
As seen above,s 7 some laws give a different answer to the battle of forms depending on the circumstances. In Dutch law, e.g., a first-shot rule applies in principle.ss If however the other party rejects the first standard terms explicitly in a separate statement (i.e. not only in its own standard terms) and if the standard forms in the second shot differ only with respect to minor points when compared to the terms referred to in the first-shot, a last-shot rule applies instead.s 9 If, on the contrary, the other party rejects the first standard terms explicitly and the second terms differ considerably from those in the first-shot, a knock-out rule may apply.9° Given that in some jurisdictions different rules may apply depending on the circumstances of the case, the question is whether Art. 6(1) of the Hague Principles refers to the outcome under the respective domestic law in general or to the outcome in the specific case under examination.
Under Art. 6 (I )(b) of the Hague Principles, in a given case it needs to be established whether under both designated laws "the same standard forms prevail [ ... ], different standard terms prevail, or[ ... ] no standard terms prevail". 91 It thus needs to be shown that, under each law designated respectively, the standard terms of the party designating this law meet, in principle, the conditions set for the inclusion of standard terms (i.e. that there definitely is a battle of forms), and that, under both laws, in the battle of forms situation under examination the same standard terms prevail. The terms definitely need to prevail which is to be established for the precise case under examination. • 91 Emphasis added.
D. An Evaluation of the Hague Solution when Compared with Possible Alternatives
I.
Benefits of the Principles with Respect to their Competitors
The above scenarios show that the Hague Principles provide an explicit solution for all possible choice of law scenarios in battle of forms situations. Contrary to the first of the alternative solutions presented above, 92 under the Principles no recourse to the !ex fori is necessary. In contrast with the second proposal, the Principles respect the parties' desire to avoid objective connecting factors and to have their choice respected as much as possible and notably in situations of a false conflict with respect to the choice of the applicable law. Contrary to the third of the above solutions, the Principles avoid proceeding in a two-step approach (i.e. determining the applicable law first by way of objecting connecting factors and then respecting the choice in the prevailing standard forms) and they thus avoid deciding the battle of forms under a law that is eventually not applicable. The Principles' approach to the battle of forms is less complex than the fourth of the above proposals and, contrary to the fourth approach, the Principles analyse the choice of law for one single contract (instead of presuming the existence of two agreements for the sake of the analysis). The Hague solution is very much in line with the fifth of the above proposals and shares the same benefits: They do not systematically give preference to any of the parties or any of the laws designated and they achieve very reasonable results in the different battle of forms situations; the knock-out rule is applied only when there is a true conflict between the solutions to the battle of forms under the laws designated by the parties in their respective forms; in situations of false conflicts the parties' choice eventually prevails. Compared to the sixth of the above approaches, the Hague solution is at a lower level of complexity while still achieving very reasonable results.
Challenge: Determining the Solutions to the Battle of Forms Situation under Foreign Laws -a Duty of the Parties to Co-operate?
When applying Art. 6(1) of the Hague Principles the challenge lies in determining the precise solutions for the battle of forms situation under examination in the laws designated by the parties. This challenge is twofold: first of all, there is an information problem. According to Art. 6(l)(b) it needs to be established whether, under both of the designated laws, "the same standard terms prevail". For the court it might be difficult to determine the content of the applicable foreign law and to determine whether, in the case at hand, it applied a first-shot, last-shot or knock-out rule. Consequently, during the meeting of the Special Commission at The Hague in November 2012, the delegation of the European Union suggested providing a 92 Supra, III.B. duty of the parties to co-operate with regard to finding and companng the applicable law under Art. 6 of the Hague Principles.
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In fact, the parties to the contract (or their lawyers), having designated the respective laws in their standard forms, should well be able to co-operate with regard to finding the applicable rule to battle of forms scenarios under the law designated in their forms . For the courts a duty of the parties to co-operate would certainly be helpful and make the solution easier to apply. The duty could be created, as the case may be, when the Principles are adopted by national or international legislators. When looking for inspiration, Art. 16(1) of the Swiss Federal Act on Private International Law (on the "Establishment of foreign law") might be taken into consideration 94 stating that "[t]he content of the applicable foreign law shall be established ex officio. [However] [t]he assistance of the parties may be requested. In the case of pecuniary claims, the burden of proof on the content of the foreign law may be imposed on the parties."
A second challenge lies in the fact that, at the substantive law level, some laws are still unclear when it comes to solving battle of forms situations, even for lawyers trained in the respective jurisdiction. In these situations it will be impossible to establish that "under both of these [designated] laws the same standard terms prevail". The consequence for the purpose of Art. 6 of the Hague Principles should then be that since an agreement on the applicable law cannot be established "there is no choice oflaw", Art 6(1)(b) in fine.
V. Conflicting Choice of Law between Domestic Laws and the CISG
A. Introduction
In the situations analysed so far, choices were to be made between domestic legal systems in areas of law where no uniform laws apply. law. In scenario 5, A has explicitly designated in its standard forms the law of State A The question then is whether the parties have validly agreed on the application of this law.
According to, for example, Art. 10(1) of the Rome I Regulation "[t]he existence and validity of a contract, or of any term of a contract, shall be determined by the law which would govern it under this Regulation if the contract or term were valid." The existence of the choice of law agreement is thus governed by the law that would govern it if the agreement were valid. 99 If the standard terms of only one party contain a choice of law clause, the existence and validity of a choice of law agreement is thus to be determined according to the law designated in these standard terms, in case 5: A' s forms designating the law of State A The Hague Principles arrive at the same conclusion: According to Art. 2(1) of the Principles the parties are free to choose the law applicable to their contract. Under Art. 6(l)(a) of the Hague Principles, the question of whether a valid agreement on the applicable law has been formed is to be examined according to the law that the parties have purportedly agreed to. The agreement on the choice of law is thus to be analysed under the law designated in A's standard terms, i.e. the law of State A 100 Consequently, if party A designated in its standard terms the law of Contracting State A to the CISG, the choice of law agreement is governed by the law of State A Is this then the CISG (being an integrated part of the law of Contracting State A) or, as the case may be, the civil code of State A, its code of obligations or its general case-law on contracts?
There are arguably two reasonable answers to this question: One possible answer is that the CISG (in particular Art. 14 et seq.) applies not only to the formation of the sales contract but also to the formation of the choice of law agreementw 1 (with respect to the issues covered by the CISG English law a last-shot rule prevails whereas under Swiss general contract law a knock-out rule applies. In this case, under one of the designated laws "no standard tenns prevail", "there is no choice of law" (Art. 6( 1 )(b) 3 rd alt. of the Hague Principles), and the law applicable to the contract is determined by way of objective connecting factors. Variation: If under the CISG a knock-out rule applied (instead of a last-shot rule), 110 the case would be governed by Art. 6(l)(b) 3rd alt. of the Hague Principles. There would be "no choice of law", and objective connecting factors would be needed to determine the law applicable to the contract.
(b) The second possible interpretation argues as follows: The choice of the sales law of a Contracting State to the CISG includes, in principle, the CISG. However, the choice of law agreement itself (being a separate contract, not governed by the CISG) is governed by the general contract law of the designated State.
English law applies a last-shot rule, Swiss general contract law a knock-out rule. According to Art. 6(l)(b) 3rd alt. of the Hague Principles, if "under one or both of [the chosen] laws no standard tenns prevail, there is no choice oflaw". The law applicable to the contract is then to be detennined by way of objective connecting factors. When the CISG enters into consideration, the outcome thus much depends on several disputes concerning the interpretation of the CISG. Ambiguities of the CISG and uncertainties concerning its interpretation can unfortunately, but obviously, not be solved by the Hague Principles.
VI. Conclusions
Currently, in basically every jurisdiction analysed, there is very much uncertainty as to how to solve the problem of conflicting choice of law clauses in standard terms. The issue has so far never been explicitly addressed in a black letter rule, neither in the Rome I Regulation nor the Hague Sales Conventions nor in any other international instrument or national PIL statute. Case-law on this issue is rare and the law is complicated to the point that the courts try to avoid the problem, they bypass the issue at the PIL level or they simply apply the !ex fori without even addressing the problem. 111 The international legal doctrine currently suggests six different solutions to the problem, some of considerable complexity.
112
As long as the solution to the battle of forms with regard to choice of law is unclear, it is wholly unforeseeable for the parties which law governs their contractual relationship. They then lack the most fundamental basis for their 11° For references supporting this view, see supra (note 27). 112 Supra, III.B.1-6. When trying to teach the issue of conflicting choice of law clauses in standard terms, one might quickly be tempted to abandon the idea of mentioning it at all, given that the issue is so controversial and the outcome so vague.
negotiations should a problem in their contractual relations arise. 113 With respect to a solution to the problem of conflicting choice of law clauses, the law currently leaves the parties alone.
During the negotiations leading to the Hague Principles on Choice of Law for International Contracts in November 2012, the experience was that by addressing case scenarios on conflicting choice of law clauses in standard terms, it was possible to find consensus with respect to a reasonable solution for any of them. Based on the solutions agreed upon, a rule achieving these solutions was drafted. This procedure eventually resulted in Art. 6 of the Hague Principles. The purpose of this provision is to promote party autonomy on the one hand and, on the other, to enhance legal certainty and foreseeability with respect to the law applicable to choice of law clauses in battle of forms situations.
In a first comment it was argued that Art. 6 of the Hague Principles is too complicated when compared with competing solutions suggested in legal doctrine?
114 It would possibly be easier to apply a knock-out rule on the PIL level and to entirely disregard choice of law clauses when the parties point to different laws in their standard terms.
115
There is, however, a widespread discomfort in international legal doctrine with respect to such a solution, 116 and arguably rightly so. Art. 6(l)(b) of the Hague Principles thus upholds party autonomy when the conflict is only a false conflict, i.e. in cases in which, under the laws chosen by the parties, the same standard terms prevail. The Principles will be accompanied by an official commentary that will facilitate their use. In order to further facilitate the application of Art. 6, comparative legal doctrine might help clarifying the solutions in force at the substantive law level in as much jurisdictions as possible with respect to battle of forms scenarios. 115 If one day the knock-out rule has become the prevailing rule worldwide at the substantive law level, the proposal of a knock-out rule at the PIL as the only rule to follow will have to be reconsidered. The above comparative overview (supra, II) shows however that such uniformity is far from being achieved. Should such uniformity be achieved one day, the Hague Principles' Art. 6(1)(b) 2°d and 3rd alt. will apply containing a knock-out rule at the PIL level.
116 See the proposals and solutions presented supra, III.B.3.-6. 117 The author of this contribution is currently preparing such a comparative overview at the substantive law level.
